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common knowledge is necessary to attain an equilibrium in a large class of normal form games, it may lead to inconsistencies in finite, extensive form games of perfect information (Reny 1987 , Bicchieri 1989 .4 More generally, if players' epistemic states and their degree of information about other players' epistemic states are included in a theory of the game, which solutions to non-cooperative games can be derived? I believe the consequences of explicitly modeling players' knowledge as part of the theory of the game are far-reaching.
In this paper I examine finite, extensive form games of perfect and complete information. These games are solved working backwards from the end, and this procedure yields a unique solution. It is commonly assumed that backward induction can only be supported by common knowledge of rationality (and of the structure of the game). In section 2 it is proved instead that the levels of knowledge of the theory of the game (hence, of players' rationality) needed to infer the backward induction solution are finite.
That limited knowledge is sufficient to infer a solution for this class of games does not mean it is also a necessary condition. In section 3, I introduce the concepts of knowledge-dependent games and knowledge-consistent play, and prove that knowledge has to be limited for a solution to obtain. More specifically, it is proved that for the class of games considered here backward induction equilibria are knowledge-consistent plays of knowledge-dependent games. Conversely, every knowledge-consistent play of a knowledge-dependent game is a backward induction equilibrium.
For the class of games considered, there exist knowledge-dependent games that have no knowledge-consistent play. For example, a player might be unable-given what she knows -to 'explain away' a deviation from equilibrium on the part of another player, in that reaching her information set is inconsistent with what she knows.
If the theory of the game were to include the assumption that every information set has a small probability of being reached (because a player can always make a mistake), then no inconsistency would arise. In this case, the solution concept is that of perfect equilibrium (Selten 1975) , which requires an equilibrium to be stable with respect to 'small' deviations. The idea of perfect equilibrium (like other 'refinements' of Nash equilibrium) has the defect of being ad hoc, as well as of assuming -as Selten himself has recognized -less than perfect rationality.5
The present paper has a different goal. What I want to explore here is under which epistemic conditions a rationality axiom can be used to derive a unique prediction about the outcome of the game. As it will be made clear in the example of section 2, a small variation in the amount of knowledge possessed by the players can make a big difference, in that higher levels of knowledge of the theory of the game may make the players unable to 'explain away' deviations from the equilibrium path. The idea is that of finding the minimal set of axioms from which a solution to the game can be inferred.
Since the players (as well as the game theorist) have to reason to an equilibrium, the theory must contain a number of meta-axioms stating that the axioms of the theory are known to the players. In particular, the theory of the game T can contain a meta-axiom An stating that the set of game-theoretic ('special') axioms Ap-An-_ is k-level groupknowledge among the players, but not a meta-axiom An+l saying that An is group-knowledge among the players. If An+i is added to T, it becomes group-knowledge that the theory is inconsistent at some information set. In this case, the backward induction solution cannot be inferred.
Backward induction equilibrium
In this section non-cooperative, extensive form games of perfect information are defined and it is proved that the levels of knowledge needed to infer the backward induc-tion equilibrium are finite, contrary to the common assumption that only an infinite iteration of levels of knowledge (i.e., common knowledge) can support the solution. where Ps (t) is the probability that a play of the game ends at the terminal node t, when the players use strategies s, ..., s. We also say that si e Si is a best reply of player i against s if ni (sl si) = max ti(sl yi). Proof. By induction on the number of moves in the game. Suppose the game has only one move. Then the player who has to move, in order to play an equilibrium strategy, should choose the branch which leads to a terminal node with the maximum payoff to him. Therefore the theorem is true when F has one move. Suppose the theorem is true for games with at least K moves (K > 1). Let F be a game with at most K+1 moves, where T is the game tree for r, r the root of T, and k the number of branches going out of r (these branches are numbered from 1 to k). The node at the end of of the j-th branch from r is the root of a subtree Tj of T, where Tj is the tree for a subgame rj of F (since the game is one of perfect information). ;nl(Sl) = max 7n;j(SJ). Hence s is a pure strategy equilibrium for r.
1<j<k
The equilibrium can be found by working backwards from the terminal nodes to the root. At each information set, a player chooses the branch which leads to the subtree yielding him the highest equilibrium payoff. To illustrate this method, consider the following two-person extensive form game of perfect information with finite termination. Each player has two pure strategies: either to play left, thus ending the game, or to play right, in which case it is the other player's turn to choose. S1 = {1112, 11r2, rlr2, rl/2}. S2 = L, R). The payoffs to the players are represented at the endpoints of the tree, the upper number being the payoff of player 1, and each player is assumed to be rational (i.e., to wish to maximize his expected payoff).
The equilibrium described above for such games is obtained by backward induction as follows: at node 112 player 1, if rational, will play 12, which grants him a maximum payoff of 3. Note that player 1 does not need to assume 2's rationality in order to make his choice, since what happened before the last node is irrelevant to his decision. Thus node 112 can be substituted by the payoff pair (3, 1). At 121 player 2, if rational, will only need to know that 1 is rational in order to choose L. That is, player 2 need consider only what she expects to happen at subsequent nodes (i.e., the last node) as, again, that part of the tree coming before is now strategically irrelevant. The penultimate node can thus be substituted by the payoff pair (0, 2). At node I11, rational player 1, in order to choose 11, will have to know that 2 is rational and that 2 knows that 1 is rational (otherwise, he would not be sure that at I21 player 2 will play L). From right to left, nonoptimal actions are successively deleted, and the conclusion is that player 1 should play 11 at his first node.
Thus sl(II) = 11, ?2 (121) = L, sl(I12) = 12, and (71(S), 7r2(S)) = (1, 0).
In the classical account of this game, (I1L 12) represents the only possible pattern of play by rational players because the game is one of complete information, i.e., the players know each other's rationality, strategies and payoffs. Player 1, at his first node, has two possible choices: 11 or rl. What he chooses depends on what he expects player 2 to do afterwards. If he expects player 2 to play L at the second node, then it is rational for him to play 11 at the first node; otherwise he may play rl. His conjecture about player 2's choice at the second node is based on what he thinks player 2 believes would happen if she played R. Player 2, in turn, has to conjecture what player 1 would do at the third node, given that she played R. Indeed, both players have to conjecture each other's conjectures and choices at each possible node, until the end of the game.
In our example, complete information translates into the conjectures p(ll) = 1, p(R) = 0 and p(r2) = 0. The notion of complete information does not specify any particular level of knowledge that the players may possess, but it is customarily assumed by game theorists that the structure of the game and players' rationality are common knowledge among them.
Note, again, that specification of the solution requires a description of what both agents expect to happen at each node, were it to be reached, even though in equilibrium play no node after the first is ever reached. The central idea is that if a player's strategy is to be part of a rational solution, then it must prescribe a rational choice of action in all conceivable circumstances, even those which are ruled out by some putative equilibrium. An equilibrium is thus endogenously determined by considering the implications of deviating from the specified behavior. The backward induction requirement calls for considering equilibrium points which are in equilibrium in each of the subgames and in the game considered as a whole. This means that it only matters where you are, not how you arrived there, as history of past play has no influence on what individuals do.
Since a strategy specifies what a player should choose in every possible contingency (i.e., at all information sets at which he may find himself), and a player's contingency plan ought to be rational in the contingency for which it was designed, it is necessary to give meaning to the idea of a choice conditional upon a given information set having being reached. Does it make sense to talk of a choice contingent upon other choices that may never occur? What counts as 'rational' behavior at information sets not reached by the equilibrium path depends on how a player explains the fact that a given information set is reached, since different explanations elicit different choices. For example, it has been argued that at I21 it is not evident that player 2 will only consider what comes next in the game (Binmore 1987 Selten's 'trembling hand' model (Selten 1975 ) provides the canonical answer. According to Selten, we must suppose that whenever a player wants to make some move a, he will have a small positive probability ? of making a different and unintended move b : a instead by 'mistake'. If any move can be made with a positive probability, all information sets have a positive probability of being reached.
What relates Selten's theory of mistakes to backward induction? Since the backward induction argument relies on the notion of players' rationality, one has to show that rationality and mistakes are compatible. Admitting that mistakes can occur means drawing a distinction between deciding and acting, but a theory that wants to maintain a rationality assumption is bound to make mistakes entirely random and uncorrelated. Systematic mistakes would be at odds with rationality, since one would expect a rational player to learn from past actions and modify his behavior. If a deviation tells that a player made a mistake (i.e., his hand 'trembled'), but not that he is irrational, a mistake must not be the product of a systematic bias in favor of a particular type of action, as would be the case with a defective reasoning process.
In our example, when player 2 finds she has to move, she will interpret 1's deviation as the result of an unintended, random mistake. So if 1 plays (but did not choose to play) rl, 2 knows that the probability of r2 being successively played remains vanishingly small, viz. p(r2) = p(r21rl) = ?. This makes 2 choose strategy L, which is a best reply to player 1's strategy after allowing for the possibility of trembles. Player 1 knows that, were he to play rl, player 2 would want to respond with L, and that there is only a vanishingly small probability that R is played instead. For p(R) = ?, player l's best reply is li. Thus (I1L 12) remains an equilibrium in the new 'perturbed' game that differs from the original game in that any move has a small positive probability of being made.
According to Binmore (1987 Binmore ( , 1988 , this characterization of mistakes is necessary for the backward induction argument to work, in that it makes out of equilibrium behavior compatible with players' rationality. Otherwise, Binmore argues, a deviation would have to be interpreted as proof of a player's 'irrationality'. Is this conclusion warranted? If common knowledge of rationality is assumed, then one must also offer some argument to explain how a player, facing a deviation, can still be able to maintain without contradiction that the deviator is rational. Selten's 'trembling hand' hypothesis is not the only plausible one, but certainly it is an answer.6 But is common knowledge of rationality at all needed to get the backward induction solution? A play of the game we have just described makes a number of assumptions about players' rationality and knowledge, from which the backward induction solution necessarily follows. Let us consider them in turn. First of all, the players know their respective strategies and payoffs. Second, the players are rational, in the sense of being expected utility maximizers. Third, the players have group-knowledge of rationality and of the structure of the game. This means that each player knows that the other player is rational, and knows the other player's strategies and payoffs. Is this information sufficient to infer a solution to the game?
It is easy to verify that in the above game different levels of knowledge are needed at different stages of the game for backward induction to work. For example, if R1 stands for 'player 1 is rational', R2 for 'player 2 is rational', and K2R1 for 'player 2 knows that player 1 is rational', R1 alone will be sufficient to predict 1's choice at the last node, but in order to predict 2's choice at the penultimate node, one must know that rational player 2 knows that 1 is rational, i.e. K2R1. K2R1, in turn, is not sufficient to predict l's choice at the first node, since 1 will also have to know that 2 knows that he is rational. That is, K1K2R1 needs to obtain. Moreover, while R2 only (in combination with K2R1) is needed to predict L at the penultimate node, K1R2 must be the case at I11.
Theorem 2.2. In finite extensive form games of perfect and complete information, the backward induction solution holds if the following conditions are satisfied for any player i at any information set ik : (a) player i is rational and knows it, and knows his available choices and payoffs, and (P) for every information set IJk+1 that immediately follows Ik, player i knows at lik what player j knows at information set IJk+1.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of moves in the game. If the game has only one move, the theorem is vacuously true since at information set Ii, if player i is rational and knows it, and knows his available choices and payoffs, he will choose that branch which leads to the terminal node associated with the maximum payoff to him and this is the backward induction solution. Suppose the theorem is true for games involving at most K moves (some K> 1). Let r be a game of perfect and complete information with K+1 moves and suppose that conditions a and P are satisfied at every node of game F. Let r be the root of the game tree T for r. At information set 1r, player i knows that conditions a and P are satisfied at each of the subgames starting at the information sets that immediately follow Iir. Then at Iir player i knows that the outcome of play at any of those subgames would correspond to the backward induction solution for that subgame. Hence at Ir if player i is rational, he will choose the branch going out of r which leads to the subgame whose backward induction solution is best for him, and this is the backward induction solution for game F.
Knowledge-dependent games
Theorem 2.2 tells that, for the backward induction solution to hold, we do not need to assume common knowledge but only limited knowledge of rationality and of the structure of the game. All that is needed is that a player, at any of her information sets, knows what the next player to move knows. Thus the player who moves first will know more things than the players who move immediately after, and these in turn will know more than the players who follow them in the game. However, if the same player has to move at different points in the game, we want that player's knowledge to be the same at all of his information sets. This requirement has a natural interpretation in the normal form representation of such games. In this game, strategy rll2 weakly dominates rlr2, so if 2 knows that 1 is rational 2 will expect 1 to eliminate r1r2. In the extensive form representation, this corresponds to player 2 knowing that rational player 1, at the last node, will choose 12. In order to eliminate his weakly dominated strategy, player 1 need not know whether 2 is rational. This corresponds to the last node of the extensive form representation, where 1 does not need to consider what happened before, since it is now strategically irrelevant. Player 1 needs to know that 2 is rational only when, having eliminated r1r2, he has made L weakly dominant over R. Note that player 1, in order to be sure that 2 will choose L, has to know that 2 is rational and that 2 knows that 1 is rational, otherwise there would be no weakly dominated strategy for player 2 to delete. Having thus deleted R, l's best reply to L is 11. And this corresponds to the first node, where player 1 has to know that 2 is rational and that 2 knows that 1 is rational. Evidently player 1 needs to know more than player 2, even in the normal form, since the order of iterated elimination of dominated strategies starts with player 1's strategy rlr2. In the extensive form the backward induction argument makes player 1's previous knowledge irrelevant at his subsequent node, but this does not mean that player 1 knows less. This point becomes even clearer if we remember that we are dealing with static games: a player can plan a strategy in advance and then let a machine play on his behalf.
Given that the solution for this class of games depends upon the information possessed by the players, we may want to know whether variations in the level of knowledge would make a difference. Since only limited knowledge is sufficient to infer the backward induction solution, is it also a necessary condition? We know that assuming common knowledge leads to an inconsistency (Reny 1987; Bicchieri 1989) , but is an inconsistency produced by simply assuming levels of knowledge higher than those which are sufficient to infer the solution? In particular, it is worth exploring what would happen were the players to know what the players preceding them know, i.e., what would happen were knowledge to go in both directions.
In order to address this issue, we have to explicitly model players' knowledge of the game, as well as the reasoning process that leads them to choose a particular sequence of actions. The theory of the game will have to include a set of assumptions specifying what the players know about the structure of the game and the other players. The main result of this section is that, for any finite extensive form game of perfect and complete information, the levels of knowledge that are sufficient to infer the backward induction solution are also those which are necessary to infer it. Higher levels of knowledge make the theory of the game inconsistent at some information set.
More formally, if we have n players, and some propositions pi,..., Pm, we can construct a knowledge language L by closing under the standard truth-functional connectives and the rule that says that if p is a formula of L, then so is Kip, (i = 1,..., n) , where Kip stands for 'i knows that p'. Since we are interested in modeling collective knowledge, we add the group-knowledge operator EG, where EGp stands for 'everyone in group G knows that p'. If G = { 1, 2,..., n) Some remarks are in order. A2 tells that if i knows p, then p is true. A3 says that i knows all the logical consequences of his knowledge. This assumption is defensible considering that we are dealing with a very elementary (decidable) logical system. A4 says that knowing p implies that one knows that one knows p. Intuitively, we can imagine providing an individual i with a database. Then i can look at her database and see what is in it, so that if she knows p, then she knows that she knows it. A5 is more controversial, since it says that not knowing implies that one knows that one does not know. This axiom can be interpreted as follows: individual i can look at her database to see what she does not know, so if she doesn't know p, she knows that she does not know it. Rule KG says that if a formula p is provable in the axiom system A1 -A5, then it is provable that Kip. A formula is provable in an axiom system if it is an instance of one of the axiom schemas, or if it follows from one of the axioms by one of the inference rules MP or KG. Also, a formula p is consistent if -p is not provable.
It is easy to verify that the rule KG makes all provable formulas in the axiom system A1-A5 common knowledge among the players. Suppose q is a theorem, then by KG it is a theorem that Kiq (i = 1, ..., n). If Kiq is a theorem, then it is a theorem that KjKiq (for all j ? i), and it is also a theorem that KiKjKiq, and so on. In the system A1-A5, f i p then [-Cp. We call the class of axioms A1-A5 general axioms.
Beside logical axioms, a theory of the game will include game-theoretic solution axioms, behavioral axioms, and axioms describing the information possessed by the players. This second class of axioms we call special axioms. From A1-A17, the players are able to infer the equilibrium solution l1. To verify that this level of knowledge is compatible with a deviation from equilibrium, consider in turn the reasoning of both players. In order to decide which strategy to play, player 1 must predict how player 2 would respond to his playing rl. The main stages of l's reasoning can be thus described: rl 1 By assumption Since the conjunction of the formulas 7 and 8 is false, and in classical logic one can deduce anything from a false statement, player 2 can use this conjunction to construct a proof that "rl". Adding axiom A18 makes the theory of the game inconsistentfor player 2, therefore 2 is unable to use it to predict how player 1 would respond if she were to play R. Which leaves 2 uncertain as to how to play herself.
Let us consider as
Is the theory of the game also inconsistent for player 1? It is easy to verify that the state of information of player 1 does not let him realize that -were he to play rl-player 2 would face an inconsistency. By A18, player 1 knows K2K1R2. But the levels of knowledge assumed in A18 do not let 1 know that K2 (K1K2R1). Therefore player 1 can believe that 2 will explain a deviation by assuming -(K1K2R1). If so, he can predict that 2's response will be L, which makes him play 11. Hence a theory of the game that includes axiom A18 supports the backward induction solution. Proof. The first part of the proof is trivial, since Theorem 2. 2 illustrates a specification of the knowledge of each player that makes the backward induction equilibrium a knowledge-consistent play. The second part of the theorem can be proven by induction on the number of moves in the game. Suppose the game has only one move. In order to make a choice, the player who has to move must know his available strategies and payoffs. A rational player knows that he should choose that branch which leads to a terminal node with the maximum payoff to him. Then if the player knows his strategies and payoffs, he can infer his payoff-maximizing solution, which is the backward induction solution. Assume the theorem is true for all games involving at most K moves (some K > 1). Then it follows that the knowledge-consistent play (s1 ..., sn), restricted to any of the subgames of r having no more than K moves, corresponds to the backward induction solution for that subgame. Let F be a knowledge-dependent game with K+1 moves and let r be the root of the game tree T for F. At information set Iir there is a recommendation of play sir for player i that can be inferred from Ki 3Bayesian game theory has the same problem: the players' incomplete information about the structure of the game is simply described in the form of an extensive form game with chance moves (Harsanyi 1967 (Harsanyi , 1968 . In this case, too, some basic assumptions of the theory are not treated as part of the theory. 4More recently, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1988) proved that in information-dependent games a common knowledge axiom is inconsistent with a rationality axiom. 51 have shown elsewhere (Bicchieri 1988 ) that the various refinements of Nash equilibrium can be uniformly treated as different rules for belief change, and that such rules can be inferred from a richer theory of the game that includes epistemic criteria that allow an ordering of the rules in terms of epistemic importance. In the class of games I am considering, a theory of the game that contains a model of belief change would always let the players 'explain away' any deviation from equilibrium (Bicchieri 1988a).
6If the players were endowed with a model of belief-change (Bicchieri 1988 (Bicchieri , 1988a , there would be other hypotheses beside Selten's that make common knowledge of rationality compatible with out of equilibrium behavior.
